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The Unfinished Task of Spectrum
Policy Reform
Janice Obuchowski*
In a landmark event worthy of the sixtieth anniversary of the
Communications Act, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) in 1994 began using competitive bidding to assign certain
radio frequency spectrum licenses. As a longtime advocate of spectrum
auctions, I was heartened by this development stemming from the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which authorized the FCC to use
auctions. As the National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion (NTIA) concluded in a report issued during my tenure there, "greater
reliance on market principles in distributing spectrum, particularly in the
assignment process, [is] a superior way to apportion this scarce resource
among competing and often incompatible users."'
Based on the outcome of the initial auctions, the FCC deserves praise
for developing a successful auction process. The Commission's competitive
bidding rules ensure that the winning bids reflect the value of the licenses
being auctioned and that the licenses are assigned to those who value them
most. The introduction of spectrum auctions is an important step toward
applying market principles in the management of the U.S. spectrum
resource. But as NTIA noted in the report, U.S. Spectrum Management
Policy: An Agenda for the Future, another critical set of spectrum
management policy reforms also is needed to ensure the efficient use of
spectrum: greater flexibility must be allowed in the offering of services
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I. NATIONAL TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL
PUBLICATION No. 91-23, U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY: AN AGENDA FOR THE
FUTURE 1 (1991) [hereinafter SPECTRUM REPORT].
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within the existing spectrum block allocation scheme.' Flexibility in
spectrum use and auctions is an equally crucial component in ensuring that
spectrum is used in a manner that maximizes consumer welfare.
My purpose in this article is to sound a warning. There is a very real
risk that single-minded focus on the first reform-the introduction of
auctions-could undermine achievement of the second objective-increased
flexibility in spectrum use. The ongoing auction process at the FCC could
create new institutional forces, both within the Commission and in the
telecommunications industry, that are opposed to granting substantial new
flexibility within previously allocated spectrum blocks.
The prospect of generating large amounts of revenue from auctioning
newly allocated spectrum blocks may create unintended incentives for the
FCC to go slowly in granting greater flexibility in existing blocks. When
the FCC does move to allow .increased flexibility, auction winners will cry
injustice if the value of their licenses falls as a result. But the FCC should
not be in the business of creating spectrum scarcity through unnecessary or
obsolete regulatory restrictions. By implementing auctions and flexibility
in spectrum use with equal ardor, the FCC will ensure that all spectrum is
put to the uses that are most valued.
When the NTIA Spectrum Report was published in 1991, the odds
that its recommendation concerning spectrum auctions would be adopted
did not look favorable. A Newsweek columnist put the odds at "less than
50-50."' The FCC lacked authority under the Communications Act of 1934
(Communications Act) as amended to use spectrum auctions instead of
lotteries or comparative hearings to select licensees, and key members of
the Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress remained implacably
opposed to amending the Act to grant the FCC such authority. In March
1991, one month after the Spectrum Report was published, Congressman
Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), then Chairman of the House Telecommunica-
tions Subcommittee, restated his opposition to competitive bidding and his
preference for comparative hearings to select licensees. He referred to the
auction concept as my "pet rock."4
But by mid-1993, the budget deficit imperatives facing the new
Clinton administration and Congress, and possibly a public policy
conversion, had prompted a change of heart. Seeking additional revenues
2. Id.
3. Robert J. Samuelson, The Quiet Giveaway, NEWSWEEK, May 13, 1991, at 52, 52.
4. A Bill to Establish Procedures to Improve the Allocation and Assignment to the
Electromagnetic Spectrum: Hearings on H.R. 531 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
87 (1991) (statement of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.)).
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needed to meet the deficit targets of the 1993 budget deal, Congress
amended the Communications Act, granting the FCC authority to use
auctions.' The administration estimated at the time that auctions for
personal communications service licenses alone would generate about $10
billion in revenues for the U.S. Treasury. Although Congress's approval of
auctions was driven substantially by this revenue imperative, the amend-
ments to the Communications Act sought to insulate the FCC from relying
on a revenue-raising rationale in managing spectrum assigned through
auctions.6 Acting on its newfound authority, the FCC adopted generic and
service-specific auction rules in its general docket 93-253 proceeding, and
in July 1994, the Commission conducted the first ever spectrum auctions
in the United States.
In the area of spectrum flexibility, the NTIA Spectrum Report focused
on ways to eliminate inefficiencies caused by the rigid service distinctions
in the existing spectrum block allocation regime. While acknowledging the
benefits of the block allocation system, the report suggested ways to break
down arbitrary and inefficient boundaries among spectrum users. Specifical-
ly, it recommended that:
o Service definitions be made more flexible, in order to
accommodate a wider range of potential uses within a given
block of frequencies;
o The FCC reduce the number of spectrum blocks that are
subdivided or "suballocated" among specific groups of users
based on those users' identity or purpose. Suballocations
create demand inefficiencies by artificially excluding similar
services from one another's spectrum, the report found;
o Innovation in the various radio-based services be promoted
by allowing greater "technical flexibility" through the use of
adaptable technical standards for services within a frequency
block; and
o "User flexibility" be promoted by granting licensees more
discretion to determine the most valuable use for assigned
spectrum and the right to use spectrum flexibly.
As NTIA noted in the Spectrum Report, the FCC had already taken
initiatives in several services to allow greater user flexibility.7 In the mid-
5. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 308, 309 (West Supp. 1994).
6. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309()(7) (West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting Commission from basing
allocation decisions on revenue expectations, and limiting Commission in basing design of
auction procedures on revenue expectations).
7. SPECTRUM REPORT, supra note 1, at 60; Douglas W. Webbink, Radio Licenses and
Frequency Spectrum Use Property Rights, COMM. AND THE LAW, June 1987, at 3, 3.
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1970s, for instance, when the FCC established the Specialized Mobile
Radio Service (SMRS) in the 800-900 MHz bands, it defined SMRS to
serve a wide range of users.' This contrasted with the approach taken
before 1974 in the Private Land Mobile Radio Service (PLMRS), where
most allocations were made for specific categories of users, such as police,
taxicab, and business radio services. In 1984, the Commission acted to
eliminate artificial service barriers in the spectrum bands allocated for
public land mobile services other than cellular radio by eliminating the
separate allocations for wireline and nonwireline common carriers.9 This
change allowed either type of common carrier to use those spectrum bands.
In another action, the FCC in 1990 granted in part a waiver allowing
FleetCall, Inc. (now Nextel Corp.) to develop its digital "Enhanced
Specialized Mobile Radio" system, which Nextel is using to offer
commercial mobile services similar to cellular telephony.'l The Spectrum
Report recommended that a more comprehensive approach be adopted to
extend the benefits of increased flexibility across the regulated spectrum
bands.
In the almost four years since the Spectrum Report was released, the
Commission has continued to take specific steps to allow greater flexibility
in spectrum use, although its approach has not been as comprehensive as
one might have hoped. In 1991, for instance, the FCC began the private
radio docket 91-170 proceeding to identify ways to "refarm" or reapportion
PLMRS frequencies below 470 MHz, with the goal of providing for their
more efficient use. The FCC later issued a rulemaking notice proposing
specific changes that would allow greater flexibility in the PLMRS
frequencies, although it has yet to adopt an order implementing the
proposed rule changes.
The FCC should replicate the process undertaken in the PLMRS
spectrum refarming proceeding by identifying opportunities to allow greater
spectrum use flexibility in all of its existing frequency allocations. Efficient
use of the spectrum will be maximized only if licensees are given the
8. In re Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz, Second Report and Order,
46 F.C.C.2d 752, para. 29-43 (1974), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 51 F.C.C.2d 945,
para. 2 (1975); see also National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Commissioners v. FCC, 525
F.2d 630, 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. National Ass'n of Radiotelephone Sys. v.
FCC, 425 U.S. 942 (1976).
9. In re Elimination of the Separate Frequency Allocation Structure in Public Land
Mobile Services, Report and Order on Reconsideration, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 547, para.
1 (1984).
10. In re Request of FleetCall, Inc., for Waiver and Relief to Permit Creation of
Enhanced Specialized Mobile Radio Systems in Six Markets, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 1533, reconsideration denied, 6 FCC Rcd. 6989 (1991).
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widest possible latitude in determining which services to offer within their
assigned frequencies. In principle, the flexibility granted to licensees should
be limited only to the extent necessary to prevent radio frequency signal
interference with other users.
To the extent possible, a key objective should be to eliminate
suballocations within frequency blocks and otherwise aggregate spectrum
into larger blocks. The Spectrum Report noted the development of
broadband radio transmission technologies and the opportunities they afford
to achieve greater efficiency in the use of spectrum through sharing."
Technological advances have continued in these broadband transmission
systems, including code division multiple access, and in frequency agile
radio receivers. These advances have made the use of spread-spectrum
transmission techniques more cost effective. 2 The spectrum efficiency
gains achieved by these systems can be exploited fully only if they can be
used to transmit signals over a wide band of frequencies. This fact argues
strongly in favor of allocating new spectrum for radio services in relatively
large blocks and, where possible, aggregating previously allocated spectrum
into larger blocks.
Generally, rules the FCC has adopted or proposed in the 1990s to
govern the provision of services in newly allocated spectrum blocks are
model implementations of the flexibility principles I am advocating. In
allocating 120 MHz of spectrum for personal communications services
(PCS), the FCC deliberately adopted a broad definition of the service in
order to give future licensees the maximum possible flexibility in
developing new mobile communications services. 3
Similarly, in the FCC's rulemaking proposal to make 18 Gigahertz of
spectrum in the "millimeter wave" frequency bands above 40 GHz
available for the introduction and development of new commercial
communications services, allowing flexibility appears to be a priority for
the Commission.' 4 Under the proposed rules, the eventual licensees in
those frequencies would have wide latitude in selecting the types of
services to offer via millimeter wave technologies. Also, given the
interference characteristics of radio signals transmitted above 40 GHz, the
11. SPECTRUM REPORT, supra note 1, at 1, 62.
12. See George Gilder, Auctioning the Airways, FORBES, Apr. 11, 1994, at 99, 100;
George Gilder, The New Rule of Wireless, FORBES, Mar. 29, 1993, at 96, 96; George Gilder,
What Spectrum Shortage?, FORBES, May 27, 1991, at 324, 324.
13. In re Amendment of Commission's Rules to Establish New Narrowband Personal
Communicating Services, First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 7162, 7163 (1993).
14. New Rules Proposed to Increase the Amount of Spectrum Available for Commercial
Use, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in ET Dkt. No. 94-124 (Oct. 20, 1994).
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Commission proposed to allow additional flexibility by permitting the use
of unlicensed radio devices in 8.5 GHz of the proposed spectrum allocation.
These proposals are consistent with the Spectrum Report's recommendation
that the FCC experiment with greater user flexibility in frequencies above
10 GHz that are not heavily used."5
The PCS rules and the proposed rules to govern millimeter wave
communications services can and should serve as models for increasing
flexibility in previously allocated spectrum bands. The most significant fact
about the PCS and millimeter wave rules, however, is that they will apply
to services for which the licenses will be auctioned. It is no coincidence
that the FCC incorporated substantial flexibility into the rules for these
services. The greater the flexibility allowed in the use of the spectrum, the
higher the value of the spectrum to potential licensees. Higher-value
licenses will fetch higher prices at auction.
Conversely, however, granting greater flexibility to spectrum licensees
in other services will reduce the value of licenses sold at auction,
particularly if the flexibility is sufficient to allow a licensee to offer
services that compete with the auction winner's offerings. Given these
trade-offs, I see a danger that the introduction of auctions to assign licenses
in the PCS, millimeter wave, and other newly allocated spectrum blocks
could have the unintended consequence of hindering the extension of
flexibility in previously allocated spectrum blocks.
First, increased flexibility in other services is inimical to the interests
of the successful bidders in the auctions. Having paid large sums of money
to win the right to offer mobile services, for instance, the new PCS
licensees are likely to oppose proposals to allow the provision of similar
services in spectrum bands previously limited to nonmobile applications.
The PCS licensees will argue that it is unfair to grant existing licensees in
other services the right, free of charge, to compete with PCS. Auction
winners also will argue that increased flexibility in other services will
devalue their licenses. Indeed, such arguments were made in the 103d
Congress by parties opposed to legislative provisions that would have
allowed broadcasters to use new technologies to provide additional radio-
based services over their broadcast frequencies. In summary, the auction
winners likely will form a significant interest group opposed to allowing
increased flexibility in spectrum use.
Second, and of greater concern to me, the auction may create perverse
incentives for the FCC itself to slow or halt progress in granting flexibility
within existing spectrum allocations. Despite the statutory prohibition that
15. SPECTRUM REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
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bars the FCC from taking potential auction revenues into account in its
allocation decisions, political realities are likely to intrude. Implicitly, the
"success" of the auctions is being judged, in part, by how much money
they raise for the U.S. Treasury.
The value of the licenses assigned through competitive bidding, and
hence the prices bidders are willing to pay, are determined by several
factors, including the total amount of spectrum available for use in
providing comparable services. License values also will be affected by
perceptions of the extent to which the FCC is committed to allowing
flexibility in the use of other parts of the spectrum. Just as the substantial
flexibility allowed under the PCS rules increases the value of PCS licenses
to prospective bidders, increased flexibility in other services will depress
the value of PCS licenses. Unless it is checked, the FCC's instinct may be
to seek to maximize revenues from the auctions, rather than overall
consumer welfare.
What should be done? The FCC's spectrum management duty is to
ensure the efficient use of the U.S. spectrum resource. Allowing greater
flexibility in spectrum use is consistent with this responsibility. Thus, even
as the auctions unfold, the FCC should give clear and consistent signals of
its commitment to spectrum use flexibility. It can do so in many ways, such
as by completing the long-pending private radio docket 91-170, the PLMRS
spectrum refarming proceeding.
In order to value the spectrum being offered at the auctions, potential
bidders have the right and the need to know the FCC's intentions regarding
spectrum use flexibility. The FCC should meet their needs by committing
itself to the systematic implementation of the flexibility recommendations
contained in the NTIA Spectrum Report.
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